Japan is in a dilemma about the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. On one hand, changing international and regional environments compel Japan to shift its foreign focus to new realities. This shift impels it to behave more like a "normal" state.

On the other hand, it is haunted by its past. It goes to great lengths to assure the world and its neighbours that Japan remains pacifist and committed to nuclear non-proliferation and to its attendant obligations.

Had Japan been a "normal" state, the recent warming of US-India and Indo-Japan relations would perhaps have led it to support the nuclear deal. It would have thrilled to sell nuclear power technology to India. But a state that single-mindedly pursues business profits has decided to make sacrifices for the moment. It is unable to resolve its pacifist dilemma.

This dilemma has been compounded by the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test in Hwaderi. In July of that year, North Korea fired ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan. Japan ignored it. The nuclear test though produced shockwaves which haven't subsided.

Following the nuclear test, the Japanese press gave the impression of a change in Japan's pacifism. It was about to forego its long commitment not to manufacture, possess or import nuclear weapons. Two of Japan's senior-most politicians, foreign minister Aso Taro, and head of policy, Nakagawa Shoichi, have openly debated the costs and benefits of nuclearization.

Prime minister Abe Shinzo has pointedly refused to quieten them. He hasn't heeded to strong opposition demands to drop Taro from the cabinet. At the same time, Abe has declared there will be no debate within government on weaponization. Pressed in Parliament by the leader of the opposition, Abe appeared to indicate that discussions on nuclear weapons should not be stifled. "I think it would be going too far to say that there can be no debate at all," he said.

Japan's weaponization and amendments to its pacifist constitution to enable foreign troops' deployment would unsettle its neighbours. If Japan went nuclear, it would ignite an arms race in North East Asia. The US persuaded South Korea to stop its nuclear weapons' programme with the assurance of protection against any North Korean threat. It will go nuclear if Japan does.

China, which has a small arsenal, will ramp it up under Japanese pressure. This is the best rationale for Japan to remain non-nuclear. Another compulsion is to retain the moral high ground in its opposition to nuclear weapons as the only nation to face two atomic attacks.

Also, a large segment of the voting public remains implacably opposed to the idea of a Japanese bomb. This opposition is reflected in parliamentary opinion and in government. The current defence chief, Kyuma Fumio, for example, is a native of Nagasaki together with party powerbroker Nikai Toshihiro. They have strongly opposed the debate on the merits of nuclearization.

Nikai, the LDP parliamentary affairs chief, indirectly criticized Abe for the remarks of his aides. "The repeated comments that could risk causing misunderstanding in the international community may lead to questions about the person who appointed those people," said Nikai, a dovish former trade minister.

Leaders of Komeito, the LDP's trusted coalition partner in the coming parliamentary Upper House elections, are also uneasy about Taro and Shoichi. Although Japan's political establishment was divided on weaponization but willing for a debate, it would have been extremely embarrassing for the government to openly support the US-India nuclear deal. Supporting the deal would have meant accepting India's status equal to the five NPT nuclear weapons' states.

The Yomiuri Shimbun, one of Japan's most influential newspapers, first reported that the Abe government was considering supporting the Indo-US pact. This was even while India is not an NPT signatory. This may have been prompted by a comfort level either established or assumed to have been established when prime minister Manmohan Singh met Abe Shinzo in December 2007. The Indian PM asked Abe for cooperation and assistance with the nuclear agreement.

The nuke deal may also have been positively spun since Japanese foreign policy now accepts a new Asian reality. The reality is of the rise of India as a counterweight to China, a nuclear weapons' state. But the other compulsion also weighed heavily on Japanese policy-makers. This is Japan's commitment to non-proliferation.

Such non-proliferation concerns were reflected in chief cabinet secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki' s denial of the Yomiuri Shimbun report. He said, "Japan and the global community have valued the international system of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation based on the NPT. We will continue to seek the admission of India into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons' state."

Another factor perhaps contributes to Japan's hesitation to support the nuke deal and accept India as a weapons' state. India is still not important enough in Japan's foreign policy as India believes it to be that would warrant a major shift in Japan's non-proliferation stance.

In December, Abe and Singh agreed to bolster bilateral economic and military cooperation. But Abe expressed concerns about India's nuclear capabilities and urged adherence to international rules and address worries about proliferation. During the talks, Abe fell short of stating Japan's position on the nuclear pact.

India has only recently emerged as a factor on Tokyo's foreign policy radar. For decades, it featured as little more than a recipient of Japanese development aid. Japanese businessmen showed little interest in the country, put off by red tape, the distance, and the lack of karaoke bars.

The miniscule bilateral trade of US$ 253 million demonstrates Japan's disinterest in India. Japan's trade with India is one-twenty eighth of its trade with China. The number of scheduled flights between Japan and India is one-sixtieth of those between Japan and China. Allowing for geographical and historical disconnections, the numeric difference is just too great.

Japanese investment in India is a mere four per cent of that in China over the same period. Trade increased by twenty-one per cent last year because of aggressive moves of Japanese automobile manufacturers in the Indian market. On this spurt, India expected at least Japanese acquiescence to the nuke deal.

As the only victim of atomic weapons, and as a key supplier of nuclear technology, Japan's influential support would help India break into the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). NSG ironically came into existence in response to India's unsanctioned atomic test in 1974. It was the least Japan could do for a friend like India.

For Japan though, India may be more important as a potential counterweight to a rising China. India could be one democratic friend in Asia where most other states still have bitter memories of Japanese occupation during World War II. The Yomiuri Shimbun has highlighted India's strategic position in its pro-India editorial.

"India," the editorial says, "is an extremely important partner with which Japan can shape a new international order in East Asia because the two countries share common values of freedom and democracy. Japan must accelerate its economic and interpersonal exchanges with India to promote strategic diplomacy.…India is located in a critical position linking East Asia with the oil-exporting Middle East. Cooperation between Japan and India to develop the EAS into the central framework for in-depth regional cooperation would put pressure on the Chinese-led alternative."

In Abe's policy book, Towards a Beautiful Nation, published during his campaign to become prime minister, he even predicted that within a decade, Japan's ties with India could become more important than its relationship with China or even the United States. Wishful thinking, perhaps.

Abe argued that Japan should ally itself with Asian nations that share its values, specifically mentioning India and Australia. But looking at the way Japan is currently conducting its foreign policy, putting all its eggs into the US basket, it surely will take a while for Japan to change its perception of India and seek closer strategic relations.

Prime minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan was not as successful as one would have expected. India has not so far received the attention from Japan that it has obtained from other important global and regional actors. India deserves more than what Japan is prepared to offer, at least for the moment.

For Japan, other than China, Asia exists only marginally in its foreign policy calculations. China gets grudging recognition. Possibly, there is greater contact between India and Japan now than ever. Even so, the PM's visit was under-reported and was almost a non-event. This reveals that Japan does not give India the equal status or the status of importance that other Asian countries do.

Surprisingly, no Japanese newspaper covered the Indian PM's visit. Only a single TV channel faintly mentioned that Manmohan Singh was holding an economic/ strategic dialogue with Abe. The trade enhancement and strategic dialogue that Japan has initiated with India is more reactive than proactive. Reactive to India's possibly stronger relations with China. Japan's felt threat from China is well known.

At one level, Japan feels so well protected by the American security umbrella that it sees no urgency to cultivate another Asian power to contain China. Thus the absence of India's strategic value. India's economic clout, on the other hand, does not impress Japan. Japan has softened on the nuke deal. It is not rigidly against it as before.

But Japan will weigh many factors before committing to the nuke deal. After the Japanese refusal, India's nuclear envoy, Shyam Saran, has held high level consultations. But no change is visible yet to fundamentally alter India-Japan relations.

Japan is highly conservative and very technical in its approach. Any upgrade in relations with India needs to follow a certain pattern which suits the Japanese way of doing things. But equally, Japan tends to follow the West. It copycats the US. Asia still does not exist very much for Japan. So if the US decides to come closer to India, so might Japan.

Baladas Ghoshal is Visiting Professor, Department of Intercultural Studies, at the Nagoya City University, Japan.